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Volume 7, Issue 2 (8-2025)
Int. J. Ethics Soc 2025, 7(2): 8-12 |
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Gupta R, Nye H, Welchman J. Aidos: Nurturing Social Shame as a Moral Virtue from Plato’s Perspective. Int. J. Ethics Soc 2025; 7 (2) :8-12
URL: http://ijethics.com/article-1-388-en.html
URL: http://ijethics.com/article-1-388-en.html
1- Department of Philosophy, University of Queen, Ontario, Canada , Rahul.guptain@gmail.com
2- Departments of Philosophy, Faculty of Art, University of Alberta, Canada
2- Departments of Philosophy, Faculty of Art, University of Alberta, Canada
Abstract: (12 Views)
Introduction: In his collected works on ethical inquiry, Plato presents two distinct approaches. The first approach denies that virtue (arete) can be taught, considering not everyone worthy of education, and emphasizes the exclusivity of moral training. The second approach, however, is more practical and inclusive, suggesting that all people are capable of acquiring virtues such as aidos (shame). The present study explores the concept of aidos and the nurture of social shame as a moral virtue in Plato’s thought.
Material and Methods: The present study is a review article that works on social shame as a moral virtue. To achieve the goal, articles and books published in this domain were reviewed.
Conclusion: In the Socratic dialogue Charmides, Plato directly raises the question of whether aidos qualifies as a virtue. In Protagoras, he discusses the teachability of aidos, asserting that this virtue, unlike specialized skills, should be shared by all members of society, provided they can nurture it through learning.
Material and Methods: The present study is a review article that works on social shame as a moral virtue. To achieve the goal, articles and books published in this domain were reviewed.
Conclusion: In the Socratic dialogue Charmides, Plato directly raises the question of whether aidos qualifies as a virtue. In Protagoras, he discusses the teachability of aidos, asserting that this virtue, unlike specialized skills, should be shared by all members of society, provided they can nurture it through learning.
Type of Study: Review Article |
Subject:
Special
Received: 2025/05/1 | Accepted: 2025/07/2 | Published: 2025/08/13
Received: 2025/05/1 | Accepted: 2025/07/2 | Published: 2025/08/13
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© 2025 CC BY 4.0 | International Journal of Ethics and Society
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
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